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Between rationality and emancipation: 
(De)constructing competency ‑based education
Since the 1970s a qualitative change in educational demand has been ob-
served and emphasized in pedagogical discourse. The change in question 
resulted from fundamental changes in sociocultural life which in turn 
resulted in a shift of social needs and expectations. Being aware of the broad 
and ever -changing context of education as a whole we are increasingly 
more sceptical and inclined to distance ourselves from defining the goals of 
education in rigid, narrow, and acontextual categories of skill, technology or 
craftsmanship. 
The rationally and technically oriented tendency in education was ini-
tially a product of the first educational systems whose aim was to provide 
general access to education for the purposes of social adaptation. Formulat-
ing educational enterprises as knowledge and action procedures (skills and 
schemas) that can easily be measured and assessed has its roots in behavio-
ral psychology and positivist concepts of knowledge and science. The cult of 
reason and cognition it imposes, so characteristic to Western civilization, has 
helped forge a rationalistic vision of an individual and education.
Bureaucracy, the supremacy of technological interest and pro -meritocratic 
argumentation are the reasons why education has become an utterly reified 
means to ideological ends with the individual and social progress or devel-
opment treated in an equally objectified manner. The popularization of IT 
technologies reinforces this negative tendency (Czerepaniak -Walczak, 2006). 
Critical philosophy has dubbed this process desocialization — a condition 
in which school does not serve any emancipatory purposes and “the rules of 
interpersonal interactions take on the traits one could describe as ‘inhuman.’ 
An individual thus turns into a ‘peripheral apparatus,’ an interface of the 
operative structure” (p. 125).1
1 All the ensuing translations from Polish come from the translator.
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The new discourse on education is interrelated to the search for language 
and critical reflection, as well as argumentation to support the development 
of both the individual and the society. The synergistic teleology of individual 
and social development has been strongly represented in philosophy and 
pedagogy since the beginning of the 20th century (the examples of which are 
Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, John Dewey, and Sergey Hessen, among 
others) but dates back to the concept of the human subject from the times of 
the Enlightenment (John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau). Still, it appears that 
the rhetoric of the discussion on education should shift from adaptational to 
emancipatory and critical. What can currently be observed is that the trust 
in reason as the sole strategy of overcoming limitations, of understanding 
and operating in the world is being replaced with the belief in a multifaceted 
nature of development and its various determinants. For these reasons, I will 
refer in this paper to a context broader than just philosophical rationalism 
or psychological intellectualism and draw from pragmatism, progressivism, 
cognitive constructionism, and Habermas’s theory of rationality.
The reflection on the new aspects of constructing and employing 
knowledge and skill, but also their situatedness in the structure of personal 
and social developmental processes results in a multiplicity of educational 
discourses and consequent attempts at mapping the phenomena and catego-
ries anew. The idea of competency -based education is definitely one such 
attempt, whose goal is to work out coherent, common educational standards 
for all European citizens.
Since the 1970s many lists of professional competences have been pre-
pared for various occupational groups. These sets of detailed skill descrip-
tions are to enhance the effectiveness of educational actions as well as fa-
cilitate adaptation to ever -changing circumstances. In 1996, the International 
Commission on Education for the 21st century, chaired by Jacques Delors 
prepared an educational report entitled “Learning: The Treasure Within” 
(Part One, Chap. One, Recommendation no. 3), (http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0010/001095/109590eo.pdf). When pointing to the historically un-
precedented conditions for the circulation of knowledge, the authors of the 
report referred to two seemingly dichotomous educational imperatives: to 
hand down as much knowledge and skill as possible and to help individuals 
to steer “the world towards greater mutual understanding, a greater sense of 
responsibility and greater solidarity, through acceptance of our spiritual and 
cultural differences” (Delors, 1996). The concept of education oriented on the 
development of competences was born precisely as a result of a quest for 
such educational goals whose realization would prepare an individual for 
creative adaptation in a postindustrial world. It is in such a context that the 
category of competences understood as knowledge, attitudes, and practical 
skills that would enable one to position oneself in the world and make use of 
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technological advancements was initially popularized. Nevertheless, when 
reading the abovementioned Delors report, or similar documents for that 
matter, one can sense a certain troubling instrumentalization at work. There 
are reasons to suspect that speaking of “handing down” or “providing” 
knowledge runs the risk of being turned into a practice as the colonizing of 
minds: shaping habits, perpetuating certain patterns, and/or perpetuating 
schematic ways of thinking that hinder peoples’ intellectual independence. 
Instead of a map of activities or precise competences, a person’s “steering 
wheel” can be a competence much closer to reflectivity and wisdom than the 
list of the so -called key competences would have one think (Recommenda-
tion of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on 
key competences for lifelong learning. http://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/
EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32006H0962). 
“One can be in the world in a variety of ways” — we can either be 
subjects or play a pre -existing part (Czerepaniak -Walczak , 2006, p. 116).
Accordingly, education can facilitate adaptation to a role, a part to be played, 
and thus be a mere socializing process. A human being as a subject has the 
right to acknowledge one’s natural needs, but also to voice a critique, or 
one’s own cultural expression, and to strive for social emancipation. Paulo 
Freire cautioned against narrowing the mission of the school institution to 
fostering adaptation, in a social as well as intellectual sense: to teaching 
how to memorize instead of developing a reflective criticality towards real-
ity, and the ability to understand (Freire , 2001). Maria Czerepaniak -Walczak 
points to a peculiar paradox of education, whose goal should be to prepare 
the individual for adulthood understood as living independently and re-
sponsibly. Despite that glorious goal, it turns out that accepting what educa-
tion has to offer amounts to adjusting to a prescribed role, “speaking in 
quotes,” the effect of which is, more often than not, settling for replicating 
the social status of one’s parents (Czerepaniak -Walczak, 117). In other words, 
at best the process is completed with acquiring adaptational competences 
and endowing the individual with the status of an adult. Transgressing 
these limitations in education would only be possible by creating a project 
whose contents, methods, and the pace of acquiring certain “model“ skills 
are tailored to individual needs. Competences have both a personal and 
a social dimension. Jürgen Habermas emphasized this interrelation as he 
wrote that the “evolutionary learning process of societies is dependent on 
the competence of the single members. These, in turn, do not acquire their 
competences as isolated monads, but by growing into the symbolic struc-
ture of their social world” (Czerepaniak -Walczak, p. 128). Independence, 
proactiveness, consciousness should be the standard markers of achieving 
“adulthood,” maturity or competency, but also the instruments of social 
democratization.
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Competences: Skills or wisdom?
Competences are a concept associated with an instrumental trend in 
education, a specialist preparation to fulfilling certain professional roles or 
with particular technical skills. Currently, and largely thanks to the ongo-
ing implementation of the European standards of education, this concept 
as a kind of a theoretical construct has become a synonym for all kinds of 
human behaviors and capabilities that determine the effectiveness of one’s 
actions. Competences are identified to be a wide range of attitudes, traits, 
skills or abilities, talents, motivations, and many other categories. Despite 
quite precise estimations at hand enumerating what skills are indispensa-
ble, it still remains problematic which are the “most important” without 
which an individual is only a sum of loose predispositions, a capital in 
constant need of investment by the interested institutions. Although the 
dissidents of education have declared that competency -based education 
will eradicate the disproportions between individual social expectations 
(including those of the employers), it is debatable whether the calibrat-
ing abilities which individuals should acquire may serve only to uphold 
the existing status quo of the free market or also fostering thoughtful 
adaptation.
Due to its ambiguity this concept is in common use and has become 
a euphemism, endowed with meanings that change depending on the 
context. Maria Czerepaniak -Walczak noted that competences as a keyword 
has started do be used just whenever one is at a loss to describe individual 
qualities (p. 128).
The concept of competences is employed in colloquial speech, psychol-
ogy, sociology, and economic science. Since the 1990s it has also taken root in 
the educational sciences. Colloquially, we tend to identify this concept with 
qualifications or an ability to operate smoothly in the professional arena. 
The term has gained its popularity thanks to linguistics and Noam Chom-
sky’s concept of communicative competence (Chomsky, 1965). Even theories 
on human resources management use definitions (Kossowska & Sołtysińska, 
2002) drawing from the theory of motivation which state that competences
are a conglomerate of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that express a readiness 
to perform (Tomaszewski, 1987, p. 491). The category of experience becomes 
the pivotal point in the process of shaping and expanding competences as 
they are a personal predisposition, developed in performance.
When looking for the sources of a competency -based performance one 
could refer to the ideology of education, philosophy, and psychology. The 
place one occupies on the subject -object, ability -wisdom, or passivity -activity 
continua are only three realms for reconstructing competency -based educa-
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tion in the context of: (1) Technological orientation; (2) Humanistic orienta-
tion; and (3) Progressive -Critical orientation.
The above indicates various spaces of acquiring, developing, and actual-
izing competences within human attitudes and performance. Each of them 
is inscribed in a different scientific paradigm and refers to different ontologi-
cal, epistemological and methodological assumptions (Kwiatkowska, 1998). 
What is more, each reflects a different ideological and social context. Their 
order (hierarchy) is not random either.
Within the technological paradigm competences are conceived as a set 
of abilities, skills, behaviors, and practical knowledge. Seen in this light 
competency -based education is an instrumental kind of education where 
competences are acquired by means of social learning, familiarizing oneself 
with practice, and the structure of reinforcements. 
The technological approach to learning and competences has its rationale 
in the psychology of behavioral learning, within the positivist paradigm. If 
we were to refer to the traditions drawing from Burrhus Frederik Skinner 
and Edward Thorndike then learning competences would be an instru-
mental, behavioral process, taking place because of extraneous stimuli. 
The positivist take on knowledge and cognition as well as treating them in 
instrumental categories, namely as an instrument of controlling and chang-
ing the environment, means that the goal of education is to prepare one for 
intelligent adjustment to the external reality (see Habermas, 1984). Therefore, 
competences understood in technological terms are utterly devoid of the 
category of subjectivity, autonomy, and a system of values, being limited to 
knowledge, ready -made practices and chosen personality traits. Knowledge 
does not actualize itself here in the process of its own construction but is ac-
quired through observation of the so -called good practice and has a purely 
practical dimension. Professionalism and skillfulness are the characteristics 
of professions not typically associated with general human development. 
Instrumental competence orientation manifests itself in actions effective 
by way of exploiting proven methods and schematic scenarios. Acquiring 
knowledge, as one of the elements that constitute competences, is conceived 
as the transmission of information, tradition, norms and values generalized 
by the past generations (cf. Kwiatkowska, pp. 34—50). The instrumental ap-
proach to human activity and the process of life -preparation is expressive 
of the so -called cognitive -instrumental reason (Giroux calls this rationality 
a technical one, whereas Kwaśnica — an adaptational one). Garry Evert 
thus commented the cognitive -instrumental reason: “The end result is the 
reduction of ‘moral, aesthetic, educational and political issues to technical 
problems: why and what are reduced to how’” (Evert, 1991).
Within such a framework competences are of an “instant” (cf. Melosik, 
2009) character: condensed to typically technical, practical solutions, not de-
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manding reflection but rather flexibility and guaranteeing a quick, “instant” 
outcome, an immediate reaction. Such an education is narrow, specialized 
and a means to professional and social adaptation. Developing competences 
understood in those terms is an externally steered process, modelled on the 
transmission of knowledge, values, and norms.
Exteriority and objectivity are categories that both in education and 
life simplify human activity to receiving messages and adjusting to the 
expectations of the environment. Education built around instrumental com-
petences is a repetitive process of preparation to stereotypical actions and 
circumstances. Aims are set and defined in terms of fixed knowledge and 
skills prescribed in accordance with the standards of cultural propriety (cf. 
Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). Lists of practical competences for teachers, be they 
substantive, diagnostic, organizational, communicational, research -related, 
IT -related, etc. (Kwiatkowska, 1988, p. 17) are demonstrative of precisely 
such a reductionist approach. These competence lists characterize and pin 
down the knowledge, skills, and behavior which teachers should acquire in 
a very strict way and, theoretically at least, guarantee the effectiveness of 
undertaken actions.
Accepting the dependence of society on impersonal information codes, 
a technical/rationalistic concept of competences which is thoroughly satu-
rated with passivity and a unification of educational standards, as if their aim 
was to produce a “collective identity” (see Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). Despite 
the fact that technical competences by definition should foster adaptation 
to professional and social roles, a disadaptationality of such a strategy of 
education can be observed, which corresponds neither to individual nor so-
cial demands. Most dimensions of social and cultural life demand a greater 
degree of one’s own thoughtfulness, responsibility, and independence; the 
importance of the so -called personal soft skills (Goleman, 1994): communi-
cational, interpersonal or emotional is also emphasized.
Habermas argued that individual need for communication in modern 
society is less and less satisfied by interpretations rooted in tradition and 
we are increasingly inclined to build the consensus either drawing from 
first -hand experience of social participation or expert knowledge which then 
becomes internalized (see Habermas, 1984). As the society is increasingly 
incapable of rationalizing these by empirical/analytical means the shift from 
cognitive -instrumental to communicational rationality seems justified (see 
Habermas, 1984).
Communicational rationality takes the emphasis from the consensus ar-
bitrarily enforced by tradition and lays it on actions oriented at communica-
tion. By communicating, we achieve an understanding and consensus, while 
subjects interrelate. Striving for a state of an understanding and negotiating 
meanings generates practical interests, including those of an emancipatory 
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nature provided that the criteria or claims of “importance” such as authen-
ticity, rightness, truth, and clarity are met (see Habermas, 1984). Commu-
nicationality is also an ontic trait of subjects, based on the assumption that 
both means and ends of human activity are of a communicational character.
The multiformity of human rationality and the complexity of the social 
reality as formulated by Habermas require a complementary approach to 
developing competences in education. An answer to the needs resulting from 
the technologization of society and relativization of the essential categories 
can be found in a holistic interpretation of competences as an expression of 
a critical attitude towards the environment and one’s place therein. Accord-
ingly, a proposition to conceive of competences in a humanistic and critical 
perspective resurfaces and will be developed further in the remainder of 
this paper.
David Carr differentiates between understanding competences in terms 
of predispositions when talking about lists, sets of competences (plural) and 
competence (singular) which is a holistic capability for opinion and judge-
ment (1995, pp. 262—263). Competence and competences in the rhetoric of 
this theorist are not part of the same continuum: a shift from competences 
as a set of predispositions to competence as a reflective factor is by no means 
obvious. We could say, referring to Lawrence Kohlberg, that professional 
competence, for instance, can only be acquired at a post -conventional stage 
of development. What is characteristic for all earlier stages, particularly the 
pre -conventional one, is acting in accordance with the conventional models 
of professional and social roles, which requires competences in the instru-
mental register of the word. The conventional stage would roughly mean 
a gradual transition from imitative, schematic, and largely repetitive actions, 
to independent and creative ones (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973). What is more, 
adaptational competences, characteristic of the early stages, do not guaran-
tee attaining a broadly understood competence (professionalism, expertise, 
reflectivity) at a post -conventional stage” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Profes-
sional competence cannot be reduced to competences in the instrumental 
sense of the word as competence is an actualization of the moral values of 
a given profession” (Carr, 1995, p. 264). A contemplative disposition, self- 
knowledge and motivation — the preconditions for activity and active 
experiencing, are indispensable for developing competences understood 
in those terms. Here the individual subjectivity is the core around which 
competences are constructed, therefore one could call such an approach to 
defining competences a humanistic one.
The “discovery” of the human, as a person in educational sciences took 
place mostly thanks to humanist psychology. An interest with the human 
and the inner determiners of the developmental process was already present 
in educational sciences in the form of the psychologizing theories of the early 
118 Irena Przybylska
20th century, in paedocentrism and, at least partly, in pragmatism. However, 
it was the development of humanist psychology that has contributed to 
revaluations of the aims of education and the rules of its organization in 
a crucial way.
When reconstructing the thinking on competences bearing the assump-
tions of humanist psychology in mind (humanist orientation), one can 
distinguish the interest in the personal dimensions of competency. Focusing 
on the human being and, above all, on the process of “becoming” a person 
has caused the stress to shift from the “effects” of educational endeavors 
(competence) to the very process of development and learning. Janusz 
Kozielecki strongly emphasized the uniqueness of individual personality 
that cannot be reduced to a set of alienated components: attitudes, needs, 
thoughts, and skills (Kozielecki, 1980, p. 258). This “singularity” of personal-
ity makes education a very personal process, happening at an individual 
pace and direction. By the same token competences could only be conceived 
of as personally determined, varying from person to person and realized in 
the process of self -actualization.
Accordingly, acquiring and developing competences is also an individual 
process, originating from the inside and realized in human interactions. 
Competences are actualized via human personality and their development 
is integrated with personal development (see also Kwiatkowska, 2008). What 
logically follows in this line of thinking is that education is not really a proc-
ess of acquiring competences, but of their unravelling, creating, and expand-
ing while an individual will not be able to develop his or her competences 
if he or she lacks inner motivation and is not an active participant in the 
learning process.
When Robert W. White (1959) studied human motivation in 1959 he put 
forward a concept of individual competence as a factor significantly boosting 
the effectiveness of human actions and operating in one’s environment. Being 
different from biological motives, competence motives are never satisfied in 
an absolute way which boosts individual development. Personal competence 
seen in the light of White’s theses is an ability to engage in interactions in 
a changing, often disadvantageous social and physical environment (White, 
pp. 297—333). Simultaneously, it is the very contact with the environment 
(particularly in terms of language and society) that causes predispositions 
to grow. If confronting the environment is limited to adaptation because it 
is expected and demanded, individual competences might also be limited to 
those of an adaptational character. The full repertoire of competences can 
thrive only when individuals are expected to adapt in a creative way. Com-
petence motivation would then seem close to Abraham Maslov’s concept on 
self -actualization as the ultimate human need. Formulated in such a fashion 
self -actualization is an infinite process, perpetually open (Maslov, 1997).
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Accepting the fundamental claims of the of the humanist tendencies 
that argue that the human being is an autonomous totality and cognition 
is a subjective materialized in a communicational relationship with the 
world one should assume that competency -driven actions can only find 
“closure” in and via human personality. The development of competence in 
a humanistic sense of the word is directly linked to personal development 
and happens only by way of the subject’s direct participation. If Carl Rog-
ers’ claim that a person is a process is true, then becoming a person cannot 
be of secondary importance with respect to learning life and work tactics 
and strategies as the common interpretation of competences would have it 
(Thorne, 2003). This means that every single student, every person by nature 
has the right to pursue a different, individual kind of competences that are 
partly determined by predispositions, but also susceptible to extraneous 
influences (educational or social).
The source of the third, progressive -critical orientation in defining com-
petences is to be found in progressivism as well as in cognitive psychology 
and refers to critical thinking and functionalist epistemology. Following 
Kohlberg and Mayer one could assume that it is a progressive orientation, 
whereas if one were to draw from Kwiatkowska and her concept of the edu-
cation of teachers it should more aptly be called functional.
Within this type of orientation, competences are to be conceived of in 
a dynamic fashion, as a cognitive structure subject to reorganizing rather 
than a set of skills and knowledge or attitudes. The development in this in-
stance can be identified with progress towards higher stages of development 
that enable one to expand both cognitive and personal competences. These 
stages, referring also to Jean Piaget are relatively constant, qualitatively dif-
ferent and structured hierarchically, with the lower stages as the basis for 
the ones to follow (Garz, 2009, p. 34). When interpreting the stages of moral 
development distinguished by Kohlberg, Kwaśnica noted that competences 
are never finite and development consists in going beyond them. The high-
est standard of competences is achieved at a post -conventional stage, while 
the previous stages (pre -conventional and conventional) are of a preparatory 
character (Kwaśnica, 1995).
The progressivists insist on the importance of interaction in the devel-
opmental process where experience and cognitive conflict play an impor-
tant part. Both experience conceived by the progressivists as a process of 
verifying, redefining attitudes, thoughts, behaviors, and cognitive conflict as 
a discomfort of the educational situation are indispensable for the develop-
ment of competences. To experience authentically leads to the confrontation 
of competences: if their implications are experientially exhausted through 
a dialogic reaction with the environment then progress (i.e. development) 
can ensue (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, pp. 30—31). Accordingly, as John Dewey 
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(1910) pointed out, only those experiences that leave their creative imprint 
on future experiences are of educational value while the subject’s activity 
stimulated by curiosity and doubt leads to the reorganization of thinking, 
emotions and morality which amounts to a change in attitude and, in conse-
quence, of competences. 
The development of competences framed in such a manner is thus 
a reorganization of their structures through experiencing and interactions, 
not the exercise of skills (technological orientation) or self -actualization 
(humanistic orientation). The aim of fostering competences is a functional 
development of cognitive structures which are the source of the ability to 
interpret reality, to endow it with meanings and take an attitude towards 
it. In this context competences would need to be seen as a complex, hier-
archical structure developing towards reflectivity, intellectual and moral 
independence. It appears that such an understanding would bring the 
meaning of competences closer to wisdom: “Knowledge is information in 
context whereas wisdom is knowledge embedded in a system of values 
for the proper use of data, information, and knowledge” (Pachociński, 
1999, p. 58).
The greatest cognitive independence and moral autonomy await on the 
ultimate, post -conventional stage of development. Probably only at this stage 
a person can become a fully independent subject, creative and reflective. It is 
also at that point one’s individual way of being in a particular role (social or 
professional) constituting the core of competences can come to light.
The progressive -critical orientation actualizes the postulate of saturating 
practical activities with knowledge. This by no means signifies acquiring 
theoretical knowledge or learning via accumulating experiences (knowl-
edge, skills, values), but is a methodological and research approach in the 
cognitive process. Lawrence Kohlberg, himself following in the footsteps 
of Dewey and Piaget, reminds us that mature thinking is the outcome of 
a reorganization of cognitive structures in an interaction with the environ-
ment: “These reorganizations define qualitative levels of thought, levels of 
increased epistemic adequacy” (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 456). Processual- 
cognitive learning patterns, cognitive constructivism, as well as interaction 
models also validate such a perspective on acquiring competences.
Progressivism insists on the importance of critical thinking and con-
structing knowledge as immanently appurtenant to competences which by 
definition depend on experience. Even though this belief in the importance 
of developing reflectivity and stimulating the mind, highlighting the role 
experience plays in cognition (Możdżeń, 2006, pp. 359—362) can be traced 
back as early as to John Locke’s philosophy, it was the instrumental orienta-
tion that dominated education already in the second part of the 20th century 
and still is the predominant tendency.
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To conclude, a construction and reconstruction of the cognitive, personal, 
and operative structures that constitute and foster competences are the mark-
ers of the progressive -critical orientation of competences and competency- 
based education. Simultaneously competences are a structure comprised 
of: (1) adaptational competences — the ones that enable navigating reality, the 
crucial category therein would be information; (2) critical competences, that is 
the ability to grasp meanings and interpret reality within certain systems of 
knowledge and values; (3) emancipatory competences — responsible for taking 
action is accordance with one’s critical interpretation and introspection (cf. 
Witkowski, 1995).
Competences formulated in such terms contribute to personal devel-
opment whose ultimate goal should be the pursuit of achieving post- 
conventional standards. All of the abovementioned categories account for 
the quality of a person’s performance (and existence in general); truistically 
enough they are “necessary,” but it is not adaptation that should be consid-
ered the standard (norm), but reflective emancipation.
Each of the orientations constructed (certainly also the ones not men-
tioned here emphasizes a different aspect of human functioning with re-
spect to the environment) in conceptualizing and developing competences. 
Probably it is the context that determines which “type” of competences 
are at hand: technical, humanistic (individualistic), or functional -critical is 
to regulate one’s behavior in given circumstances. Still, the order of com-
petences implies a hierarchy akin to Habermas’s theory of the cognition- 
determining interests which in itself can be treated as model and basis for 
competency -based education (Witkowski, p. 24). From this perspective it is 
vital to shift the interest from the technically -oriented to individualistic and 
functional aspect of human actions and attitudes, yet whether such a shift 
can be distinguished in contemporary educational transformation remains 
an open question.
Competences in contemporary education
The so -called key competences that have been elaborated as part of the Bologna 
Process seem to be another convincing wish list enumerating competences 
necessary to become an active member of the society, namely, to realize one’s 
potential, develop, integrate with the society and proactively navigate the 
employment markets (cf. Recommendation of the European Parliament…, 
p. 393/13). It is disconcerting that key competences can be read as a collec-
tion of prescriptions that do not constitute a coherent structure, although 
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the existence of relationships of an indeterminate nature is acknowledged by 
the authors of the Recommendation of the European Parliament (p. 393/13). 
The end result of the Recommendation is a list of elements of alleged equal 
importance. As the Recommendation is a legal document its lapidary lan-
guage in terms of describing the context of building competences should 
hardly be a surprise, it even seems all the more important to try to read it 
from the perspective of educational sciences. A reflective practitioner will 
surely see the necessity of introducing a structure and, even more so, a hi-
erarchy. The list in question does not propose a single integrating factor that 
could turn acquiring and using the postulated competences into a reflective 
process. If we were to (de)construct this model it would appear that only the 
subject to whom the competences “belong” is the factor integrating all of 
them into a coherent, operative system.
The competency -based model emphasizes the change in educational 
paradigm which consisted in shifting stress from content onto the subject, 
and which is a continuation of the Socratic tradition, but also of the ideas of 
the Enlightenment as well as progressive ones. Still, in the minds of many 
practitioners and theorists competency -based education figures rather as 
a compilation of skills acquired at varying degrees and at different stages of 
education than a construct or considerable complexity.
The Recommendation verbalizes an expectation that educational sys-
tems will develop competences and calibrate the effects. The competences 
presented require operationalization, a reference to certain behaviors, at-
titudes, skills, and knowledge so that they can be observed and “measured.” 
Operationalization, however, runs the risk of a narrowing or simplification 
of the structure of competences. Referring to a list of abstracted elements 
of fragmented knowledge, actions and skills without articulating expressly 
their interrelations and once again, diminishes the potential of education to 
developing solely adaptational and instrumental skills.
Competences are inherently dynamic, never finite or complete, as is de-
velopment itself. Every single competence seems to have an endless potential 
to expand and transgress its limits. At the same time, upon close inspection 
into the structure of competences one can distinguish their vertical devel-
opment: from relatively simple such as adaptation, up to the less obvious, 
complex ones of the critical -emancipatory character and reflectivity. Their 
open structure makes educational competences educationally valuable in 
themselves but it is also a precondition for moving to the post -conventional 
stage. Although reflectivity and autonomy constitute the highest stage of 
competences -development, every single part of the educational process 
should contribute to bringing us closer to this state. If competences are 
ontological features subject to development through education then the idea 
of competency -based education is submerged in the liberal social and politi-
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cal ideology, which manifests itself, among other things, in the concept of 
a meritocratic society. 
Because meritocracy is an ambiguous concept it needs to be emphasized 
that my usage of the term in this paper denotes a particular methodology of 
building the social structure where positions are dependent strictly on the 
competences proven by education (a diploma to be more precise) (Melosik, 
2009, p. 106). A meritocratic society sanctions all differences in social posi-
tions occupied as consequence of earning diplomas if they result from the 
differences in skills and motivation (Young, 1958, p. 94, as cited in Melosik, 
2009). The educational system by definition should “channel” people into 
fulfilling certain functions, taking positions both high and low in the social 
and professional structure in accord with their individual talents (Gmerek, 
2001, p. 297) as bases for developing competences. This idea of individual 
merit inherited from the Enlightenment positions the individual with his 
or her talents and motivation as the source of success, at the same time at-
tributing to education the power of recognizing and developing personal 
competences that are a particular form of social capital that determines one’s 
position and actions within the society.
Making education a strategy of building the human capital runs the risk 
of reinforcing existing inequalities, conditioning young people to adapt to 
the highest possible degree to meet the needs of potential employers rather 
than encourage their emancipation. Thus, the meritocratic rhetoric does not 
correspond to critical rhetoric (Gmerek, 2001, pp. 109—113). Although the 
sole rejection of nepotism and oligarchy with respect to building the social 
structure is a point of reference for building education and society on the 
foundations of human subjectivity.
From my personal perspective as a pedagogue, a teacher, and an aca-
demic, it seems natural and obvious to accept certain romantic (utopian) or 
maybe simply critical assumptions. If competency -based education is to be 
focused on the subject and not on credentials then the only preliminary and 
necessary condition for education is the child and its own individual po-
tential (Recommendation of the European Parliament Act of the Council of 
18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning).
Education should be a space for development of competences and motiva-
tion, one that optimizes the child’s abilities; not an instrument of assigning 
positions but a path to a creative construction of one’s identity. Generating 
capital to bring equally measurable profits should be left to businessmen and 
bankers. 
The Polish PWN dictionary describes meritocracy as a futurological con-
cept and yet already in the first decade of the 21st century it was a collective 
“rehearsal” of building meritocratic societies — the rule of the “competent” 
people and the “competent” society.
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In the face of an alarmingly growing number of people with a higher 
education yet unemployed and, more and more frequently — without 
competences, the meritocratic enterprise has met criticism. We can only 
hope that the systemic changes in education initiated by the Bologna 
Declaration will not perpetuate the meritocratic patterns granted that the 
document be constructively interpreted in terms of reflectivity and wisdom. 
In the socio -ideological context briefly sketched above the shift from the 
instrumental and adaptational paradigm to the competency -based/emanci-
patory one appears to be a conditio sine qua non for the idea of humanistic 
education to last.
Reflectivity as the highest standard of competences
If we assume that every professional action is founded on thinking then 
we should agree with the claim that what distinguishes experts from 
specialists -in -the -making is a symbolic knowledge rooted in experience and 
consisting in the ability to deduce. Within the expert mind knowledge has 
already been “compiled,” processed and it might seem that an expert does 
not need to meditate upon one’s actions. There is even a general presump-
tion that being an expert requires the ability to act immediately in all cir-
cumstances, that expertise is a condition of a certain automation of actions. 
We also often tend to look for experts ready to come to our assistance in an 
immediate and intellectually effortless way; as if competence was measured 
by the quickness and accuracy of response. Experts build their competences 
in heuristic processes which, combined with “scientific” knowledge, turns 
them into reflective practitioners. If we denied ourselves the opportunity to 
seek commonsensical knowledge, if we discredited it altogether and isolate 
it from the totality of social relations then we could operate mechanically, 
computer -like, using only the repertoire of pre -programmed schemas and 
patterns.
The threat of “underinterpreting” competency -based education springs 
precisely from the conviction that competences need to be only of a practical 
nature to guarantee a smooth, easily noticeable and measurable performance 
of quality improvement. If we accept the notion of competence as a theo-
retical construct that delineates the territories or educational endeavours 
then we should associate it with a progressive -critical context rather than 
a pragmatic one. First and foremost, it seems that very few activities do not 
require any reflection whatsoever and we rely solely on learnt behavioral 
patterns while engaging in them. What is more, the situations we encounter 
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in the contemporary world tend to be complicated to such a degree that they 
require constant alertness and consciousness. Donald Schön has dubbed 
this state of mind reflectivity and a person that operates and performs in 
a conscious manner — a reflective practitioner (1987, after Gołębniak, 1998, 
pp. 150—151).
The idea of reflectivity is a result of the critique of a simplified under-
standing of the correlation between theoretical knowledge and practical 
actions (Aristotelian practical wisdom) and technical rationality. Habermas 
describes reflection as self -determination, that is, a process of realizing 
a pre -determined sociological context and ideological limitations, as well as 
taking control of this influence (Carr, 1995, pp. 262—263). On the other hand, 
John Dewey considers reflectivity a state of profound contemplation upon 
acting, as opposed to acting in a routine manner. Thinking is a constant, 
active meditation on beliefs, knowledge, and an “ability to ‘turn things over,’ 
to look at matters deliberately (Dewey, 1910, p. 66). Schön emphasizes the 
importance of wonder and intuitive knowledge in professional performance. 
The experience of wonder, of astonishment and contemplation fosters the 
ability to think one’s actions and their results through in an interactive way 
as well as helping to develop cognitive intuition which can manifest itself 
in performance. Such a formulation has the character of a discovery, closely 
bound with the workings of cognitive schemas (1987, pp. 150—151). If this be 
true then a practitioner experiments like a researcher, seeks for the hidden 
“meaning” and for changes in the situation and/or behavior.
Reflectivity is shaped by way of a repetitive personal experience and such 
a notion of knowledge and practice as the one represented by Schön is close 
to cognitive constructivism. The processual -structural approach to building 
knowledge has significantly contributed to the conceiving of education in the 
categories of competency. Competences of the individual and the knowledge 
that constitutes them are the result of the student’s psychological construc-
tion and his or her way of operating actively. The individual confronts both 
the environment and oneself in the constant process of organizing and 
reorganizing one’s own worldview. Reflectivity is thus a manifestation of 
the highest standard of competences.
Thanks to Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky the idea that learning begins 
with familiarizing oneself with particular elements and finds its closure in 
expertise, with the abstract internalization of sophisticated rules (Illeris, 
2003), has found general acceptance. The stages of acquiring competences 
correspond to this model with reflectivity and autonomy of actions as their 
ultimate mode. If acquiring competences is a process, then competences can 
be neither a closed structure nor a collection of simple predispositions, but 
a totality testifying to achieving the post -conventional stage — thus becom-
ing the consciousness of individual existence.
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Thus, the understanding of competences is finally enriched with the 
human factor: if facts, rules, strategies, quickness, and precision of reac-
tion were to be proof of expertise in a particular field then computers and 
artificial intelligence would replace humans not only by the assembly lines 
and in operating steering programs, but also in other fields: managerial, 
social, etc.
Seen in this light can competences be considered a temporal or rather 
a universal category? Perhaps we have just coined a new name for our eter-
nal longing for education to “prepare” for living with oneself and with other 
people?
Such a clear and well justified demand for education focused on a per-
forming subject that would prepare individuals to creative adaptation seems 
historically unprecedented. Furthermore, never before have the declarations 
of pursuing this prerogative been so close to realization either. Unfortu-
nately, the ongoing transformations in the theoretical (ideological) domain 
as well as in the sphere of their realization seem to indicate that compe-
tences have yet again been reduced to simple, observable behaviors, practical 
skills or even to the reproduction of knowledge (e.g. school competency tests 
that boil down to checking progress in terms of the curriculum). Although 
some attention is dedicated to new dimensions and strategies of learning, 
the changes implemented are often of a superficial and chaotic character 
due to the complexity and multifacetedness of competences. Sadly, one can 
often hear opinions voiced by malcontent practitioners expressive of a “call 
it (competences, knowledge, skills) as the politicians or experts wish, we’ll 
carry on as we always have” approach.
Competences, competency or reflectivity — whichever name we pick 
to describe personal predispositions — are definitely not a mere collection 
of skills and experiences or internalized rules. At the same time, they are 
also something more than intelligence, cognitive -instrumental rationality or 
knowledge, even of a most advanced kind. That peculiar quality is the sum 
of one’s intuition and reason, experience and knowledge, consciousness and 
unconsciousness, adaptation and critical awareness. I am convinced that if 
education is to develop competences then not only skills should be embraced 
by its agenda but also reflectivity and critical awareness. Competency -based 
education is one whose: “[o]utcome is adulthood conceived as the fusion of 
freedom, independence, and responsibility, as a rational and critical mode of 
being in the world” (Czerepaniak -Walczak, 2006, p. 117).
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Conclusion
Education has been organized by the society to satisfy its pragmatic demands, 
and particularly to foster adjustment and adaptation for centuries. It has also 
performed a stratifying function whereas philosophers have emphasized the 
autotelic value of science and knowledge. And yet does its autotelic stand in 
opposition to pragmatism? The history of pedagogical thought and practice 
proves just how difficult it is to balance the autotelic and the pragmatic 
aspects of education, the contemporary educational disciplines also testify 
to this difficulty.
Since the very beginnings of educational systems mass education has 
induced collective social dissatisfaction with its quality and standards. Aca-
demics have either leaned towards the humanities and general education, 
or towards its practical (pragmatic) counterpart when sketching their peda-
gogical concepts or ideologies. Similarly today the proposed education built 
around competences can fall prey to instrumentalization though it seems 
clear that it can be endowed with a greater, broader sense when enriched by 
the constructivist -humanist dimension.
Competences as a complex notion run the risk of simplification, of 
reducing the importance of space between the elements of the structure. 
To speak of competences has become a euphemism denoting a universal 
construct applied whenever the concept of wisdom seems outdated and 
the one of reflectivity too lofty and academic. A superficial, behavioral 
education limited to developing “necessary” life -skills is a way of distanc-
ing the educational enterprise from the humanist values of individuality, 
reflectivity, and wisdom among others. The contrary practice with exclud-
ing practical skills such as communication, conflict resolution, and inter-
personal competences carries the risk of inadequate or even destructive 
behaviors.
The tensions resulting from civilizational changes widen the so -called 
human gap — the inadequacy of human behaviors towards dangers and the 
strains they face. Is it possible for competency -based education to “bridge” 
(Botkin et al., 1998) this gap? It seems that the current state of education 
fosters neither adaptation nor emancipation but rather hampers becoming 
a subject and fails to nourish culture. This bridging over the existing dis-
crepancies is more likely if an actual educational shift from the culture of 
objects to the culture of subjects happens, also with respect to competency- 
based education (Obuchowski, 1988, p. 59).
The vision of competency -based education I have outlined in this paper 
is in itself an attempt at bridging the discrepancy between a poststructural 
reality and the postulates of education. It is an invitation to move on from 
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developing technical and practical rationality to the emancipatory and post- 
conventional one.
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Irena Przybylska
Entre la rationalité technique et émancipatrice :
(Dé)construction d’une formation de compétence
Résumé
Le texte aborde le problème de compétence et compétentialité de la formation présenté 
dans le contexte des discours philosophiques, idéologiques et éducatifs choisis par 
l’auteur. Les réflexions sur les compétences prennent naissance dans le rationalisme 
philosophique et l’intellectualisme psychologique, tout en puisant dans le pragmatisme, 
progressivisme, constructivisme social et dans la théorie de l’agir communicationnel 
de J. Habermas. Une partie du texte constitue une tentative de placer la catégorie 
compétences—compétentialité dans l’orientation instrumentale, humaniste et fonction-
nelle de l’éducation, ainsi que de présenter les tendances évolutives de la formation 
de compétence à la lumière des programmes européens réformant les systèmes sco-
laires.
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La notion de compétence définie comme une catégorie linguistique (euphémisme) 
contient plusieurs significations. Elle apparaît aussi bien dans la rhétorique scientistique, 
méritocratique qu’humaniste. Dans les parties finales du texte, les réflexions s’appuient 
sur l’interprétation dichotomique de la compétence : capacité—réflexivité. L’intention de 
l’auteur est d’accentuer la nécessité de transférer l’interprétation de la compétence de 
ses sens acontextuels et purement pragmatiques aux sens vastes, émancipationnels et 
s’inscrivant dans le développement subjectif de l’homme.
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Między racjonalnością techniczną a emancypacyjną:
(De)konstrukcja kształcenia kompetencyjnego
St reszczen ie
Tekst dotyka problemu kompetencji i kompetencyjności kształcenia w kontekście 
wybranych filozoficznych, ideologicznych i edukacyjnych dyskursów. Rozważania 
o kompetencjach wychodzą z filozoficznego racjonalizmu i psychologicznego intelek-
tualizmu, czerpiąc z pragmatyzmu, progresywizmu, konstruktywizmu społecznego 
i teorii racjonalności J. Habermasa. Część tekstu to próba umieszczenia kategorii kompe-
tencje—kompetencyjność w orientacji instrumentalnej, humanistycznej i funkcjonalnej 
w edukacji, a także ukazania tendencji rozwojowych kształcenia kompetencyjnego 
w świetle europejskich programów reformujących systemy oświatowe.
Pojęcie kompetencji ujmowane jako pewna kategoria językowa (eufemizm) niesie 
wiele znaczeń. Pojawia się zarówno w retoryce scjentystycznej, merytokratycznej, jak 
i humanistycznej. Konsekwentnie rozważania w końcowych częściach tekstu osadzają 
się wokół dychotomicznego rozumienia kompetencji: umiejętności—refleksyjności. In-
tencją autorki jest zaznaczenie konieczności przesunięcia interpretowania kompetencji 
z akontekstualnych i wyłącznie pragmatycznych znaczeń w kierunku szerokich, eman-
cypacyjnych, wpisujących się w podmiotowy rozwój człowieka.
